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“Demographics explain about two-thirds of everything.”
— David K. Foot, Boom, Bust & Echo, 1996
T
he labour force participation rate under-
went an unprecedented fall during the last
recession and the subsequent slow recovery, de-
clining three percentage points from peak to
trough. In all likelihood, this decline reflects a
combination of cyclical and structural factors.
The extent to which this fall is structural has
major policy implications. In the short term, it will
have an impact on the estimated output gap and,
hence, the appropriate conduct of monetary and
fiscal policies. A lower structural participation
rate will also mean the economy has less room to
grow over the short to medium term before run-
ning against its sustainable, non-inflationary level
of output, and the unemployment rate will fall
more quickly in response to stronger employment
growth.
Longer-term, a continued decline in the partici-
pation rate because of structural factors will exert
downward pressures on potential output, the em-
ployment ratio and gross domestic product per
capita. It is relatively well known that the ageing
of the baby-boom generation over the next dec-
ades will tend to significantly depress source
population growth and, hence, potential output
growth, while increasing dependency ratios. At is-
sue here is the strong possibility these downward
pressures on growth will be compounded by a
falling participation rate.
The key is to know how much of the downturn
is purely cyclical and how much is structural. To
highlight this issue, we use a simple, accounting
framework that combines plausible trend partici-
pation rates for 16 demographic groups with
source population data to estimate an aggregate
structural participation rate for the Canadian
economy. This not only enables us to assess the
current structural participation rate, but also its
prospects over the next four decades.
Our study updates the work of MacGregor and
Mang (1996) and highlights the impact demo-
graphic shifts had on the aggregate participation
rate in the 1990s and will continue to have in com-
ing decades. In contrast to the conventional wis-
dom that the ageing of the population will start to
dampen the aggregate participation rate only
when baby-boomers start to retire in a few dec-
ades, our results show the ageing of the popula-
tion has already started to exert downward pres-
sures on the aggregate participation rate. This
results from a trend toward increased life expec-
tancy, which translates into a trend increase in the
proportion of the working-aged population aged
65 and over. Although this trend was masked by
the entry of baby boomers into the labour market
in the 1970s and early 1980s, since the mid-1980s
the underlying downward pressures associated
with an older society have again dominated the
overall participation trend. As a result, baby
boomers’ retirement will not start but rather in-
tensify a downward trend in aggregate participa-
tion.
An Accounting Approach
MacGregor and Mang (1996) suggest a simple
accounting framework to calculate the trend par-
ticipation rate at the aggregate level. The ap-
proach is based on the idea that changes in the
aggregate participation rate reflect changes in the
participation rate of individual age-sex cohorts as
well as changes in the importance of each of these
cohorts in the source population. More formally,
we have:




(2) wi,t = SPi,t ¤ SPt
where PRt is the aggregate participation rate in
year t, PRit is the participation rate of cohort i in
year t, and wit is the share of cohort i in total
source population, SPt, in year t. The trend aggre-
gate participation rate (PRTt) in year t is defined
as:




where PRTit is the trend participation rate of co-
hort i in year t.
This paper uses the framework described by
(3) to estimate the aggregate trend participation
rate since the mid-1970s, the starting period for
the current Labour Force Survey, as well as to as-
sess its prospects over the next four decades.
Source population series are taken from actual
population data and Statistics Canada’s moderate
growth projection (Scenario 2).1 We identify 16
demographic groups (i = 1, 2, ...16) in the analy-
sis — 10-year gender-specific cohorts, except for
youths and older people where five-year cohorts
are used. It is important for these groups to use
five-year cohorts because significant differences
in their participation rates provide a richer esti-
mate of the demographic effect.2
Trend participation rates for the 16 demo-
graphic groups correspond to plausible assump-
tions based on the results of econometric studies
and a comparison with U.S. participation rates of
similar demographic groups.3 Only a few
econometric studies have analysed the participa-
tion rate behaviour for detailed Canadian age-sex
cohorts. Archambault and Grignon (1999) and
Rose (1994) have analysed youth participation
rates, Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) have exam-
ined female participation rates, while Fortin and
Fortin (1997, 1999) have studied a broader range
of demographic groups.4 Moreover, the results of
some of these studies are difficult to interpret be-
cause they use the employment-to-population ra-
tio as a measure of business cycles, which should
in principle capture not only cyclical effects but
also structural changes.
As suggested by Rubin and Lester (1997), Ip et
al. (1999) and Haritos (1998), the U.S. experience
also provides useful information on benchmark
trend participation rates for various demographic
groups in Canada. In contrast to previous dec-
ades, business cycles in Canada and the United
States have diverged in the 1990s. As a result, la-
bour market indicators have also diverged; par-
ticularly the participation rate, which has risen to
a record level in the United States while it has
trended down in Canada. With the U.S. economy
now at or above potential, U.S. participation rates
are likely free of important cyclical factors, reveal-
ing underlying changes in structural participation
rates of individual age-sex cohorts. This suggests
the actual U.S. participation rates for detailed
demographic groups can be used to gauge the
structural participation rates for comparable
demographic groups in Canada.
One advantage of the framework used here is
its ability to capture the effects of continuing
demographic changes on the aggregate participa-
tion rate. In our framework, structural changes in
the aggregate participation rate reflect either
changes in individual trend participation rates or
a change in the composition of the source popula-
tion for given individual participation rates — the
demographic composition effect. It is convenient
to define this effect with the following:
(4) PR
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which is the aggregate participation that would
have been observed at time t if all individual par-
ticipation rates would have remained at their 1989
levels. The annual average demographic compo-
sition effect between year t and t+k is then sim-
ply defined as:





A negative (positive) demographic composi-
tion effect indicates source population has
moved, on average, from age cohorts with higher
(lower) than average participation rates to age co-
horts with lower (higher) than average participa-
tion rates over a given period. Obviously, a nega-
tive demographic composition effect would
reduce the aggregate structural participation rate,
while a positive demographic composition effect
would increase it.
  Summer 1999  Canadian Business Economics   43 Table 1 Average annual demographic composition effect, Canada, 1921-2040
(Percentage points)
Period Effect Period Effect Period Effect
1921-1930 -0.104 1960-1970 -0.105 2000-2010 -0.210
1930-1940 -0.122 1970-1980 -0.008 2010-2020 -0.335
1940-1950 -0.095 1980-1990* -0.032 2020-2030 -0.229
1950-1960 -0.048 1990-2000 -0.119 2030-2040 -0.086
* Between 1980 and 1985 the average annual demographic effect was positive at 0.016 percentage point, while it was
negative between 1985 and 1990 at –0.079 percentage point.
Table 2 Age composition of working-aged population, Canada, selected years
1921-2041
Year
Share of Population aged (per cent):
15-24 25-54 55-64 65-69 70+ Males  70+
Females
70+
1921 26.3 57.3 9.0 3.0 4.3 2.2 2.1
1931 27.5 55.0 9.3 3.3 4.9 2.4 2.4
1941 25.9 53.8 11.0 3.7 5.5 2.8 2.8
1951 22.0 55.8 11.0 4.4 6.7 3.3 3.4
1961 21.7 56.0 10.7 4.0 7.5 3.6 3.9
1971 26.4 50.9 11.3 4.0 7.3 3.2 4.2
1981 25.2 51.2 11.3 4.4 7.9 3.2 4.7
1991 18.1 56.6 10.9 4.9 9.5 3.8 5.7
2001 16.5 56.4 11.5 4.5 11.2 4.5 6.7
2011 15.7 52.3 15.1 5.3 11.7 4.8 6.9
2021 14.0 48.0 16.7 6.8 14.5 6.2 8.3
2031 13.5 46.3 14.4 7.4 18.4 7.9 10.5
2041 13.4 45.4 14.4 6.5 20.3 8.6 11.7




Before moving to look at participation rates for
individual age-sex cohorts, we first want to high-
light continuing demographic changes in the Ca-
nadian economy and their impact on the aggre-
gate participation rate (Table 1). The
demographic composition effect has displayed
two distinct phases since the early 1970s.5 In
1970-85, the effect of the demographic evolution
on the participation rate has been roughly neutral
on average. However, since the mid-1980s it has
had a negative impact, removing about 1.25 per-
centage points from the participation rate. From
the aggregate participation rate’s peak level in
1989, the demographic composition effect has al-
ready removed almost one percentage point from
it by 1997. Moreover, it will continue to be nega-
tive for many decades, removing an additional 8.5
percentage points from the structural participa-
tion rate by 2030. In the next four decades or so,
the annual demographic effect will intensify to
peak at about -0.35 of a percentage point a year in
2015, compared with -0.14 of a percentage point
in 1997, before falling gradually to about -0.04 of
a percentage point a year in 2040.
A detailed decomposition of the demographic
composition effect for 1989-96 will be found in Ta-
ble A1. It shows that the lower contribution to the
aggregate participation rate from younger cohorts
has been only partially offset by higher contribu-
tions from older cohorts. Most important, the
share in source population of people aged 70 and
over increased by 1.4 percentage points but had a
negligible effect on the aggregate participation
rate given their low participation rates.
The negative demographic composition effect
is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, Table 1 shows
that 1970-85 is the anomaly. Aside from this pe-
riod, the demographic composition effect has ex-
erted downward pressure on the aggregate par-
ticipation rate since the 1920s. This downward
trend in the demographic composition effect re-
flects continuous increases in the share of older
people in the source population, particularly
women aged 70 and over, which, in turn, mirror
the increase in life expectancy experienced since
the 1920s (Table 2). The pause observed in the
1970s and early 1980s reflects the temporary off-
setting effect of baby boomers who were entering
into the workforce (see Chart A17).




To complete our analysis, the trend or struc-
tural participation rates for the 16 demographic
groups are specified. Actual participation rates of
the 16 age-sex groups in Canada and the United
States in 1976-97 are plotted (Charts A1-A16).
The first observation that can be made from
these charts is that youth participation rates ap-
pear to be sensitive to aggregate cyclical down-
turns, while adult participation rates appear to be
mainly driven by structural factors. However, the
participation rate of adult males aged 25-34 is one
notable exception. This group seems to be more
sensitive to business cycles than other adult co-
horts, particularly in the 1990s. Most empirical
analysis has confirmed that participation rates for
youths are sensitive to business cycles or employ-
ment opportunities, but have had trouble identi-
fying a robust cyclical effect for adult cohorts.6
The exception is Fortin and Fortin (1997) who
have concluded that, with the exception of prime-
aged males, adult participation rates are as much
or even more sensitive to business cycles than
youth participation rates.
This last conclusion is difficult to reconcile
with the graphical evidence. The source of the op-
posing results seems to be the variable they used
to capture business cycles or job opportunities in
these empirical studies: the ratio of employment
to source population. The employment-to-popu-
lation ratio is not a measure of the imbalances be-
tween the demand and the supply of labour but
the endogenous result of the interaction between
them. To capture the business cycle, a measure of
the level of the employment consistent with the
underlying potential supply of labour in the econ-
omy — “the natural rate of employment” — is
needed.
This measurement of business cycles or job op-
portunities is particularly troublesome when ap-
plied to a specific demographic group in which
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inter alia, on its own employment-to-population
ratio, as in Fortin and Fortin’s 1997 work. Clearly,
the two variables will be strongly correlated since
they are linked by the following identity: E/SP =
(1-UR)(L/SP) where E is employment, SP is source
population, UR is the unemployment rate, and L is
labour force. This does not mean the participation
rate of that demographic group is sensitive to
business cycles or job opportunities. Indeed, it is
easy to imagine an example in which employ-
ment-to-population ratio and participation rates
are strongly correlated because they both trend up
or down, driven only by structural factors. In that
context, the approach used by Fortin and Fortin
will wrongly suggest that the participation of that
cohort is very sensitive to job opportunities or to
the business cycle. As a result, their study is unin-
formative of the decomposition between cyclical
and structural forces behind changes in participa-
tion rates and is thus not used in this study to
benchmark trend participation rates.
In a more recent study, Fortin and Fortin (1999)
acknowledge the endogeneity of the employ-
ment-to-population ratio to the participation deci-
sion. As an alternative measure of job opportunity
they use the ratio of the help-wanted index to the
working-age population. Their new results sup-
port the graphical evidence that youth participa-
tion rates are sensitive to aggregate cyclical down-
turns, while adult participation rates are mainly
determined by structural factors.
Youth Participation Rate
The decline in the youth participation rate in
the 1990s has been particularly severe. Since
1989, it has fallen by almost eight percentage
points, compared with a 1.4-percentage-point de-
cline for adults over the same period. As noted
above, this is partly because youths tend to be
more sensitive than adults to business cycles in
their decision to participate in the labour force. In
the 1990s the decline has been shared by students
and non-students, but has been more pronounced
for youths aged 15-19, who are more sensitive to
cyclical economic downturns.
Recent econometric analyses suggest about
half this decline in youth participation reflects cy-
clical factors that will be reversed as job prospects
improve, while the balance is likely to be struc-
tural (Rose, 1994).7 One key factor that has re-
duced youth participation in the 1990s is the in-
crease in school enrolment.8 The proportion of
those aged 15-24 attending full-time school has
increased by more than 10 percentage points since
1989, reaching 58.2 per cent in 1997. Youths at-
tending school participate less in the labour mar-
ket than those not in school. Therefore, an in-
crease in school enrolment rates reduces the
overall youth participation rate. Moreover, the re-
sults of Archambault and Grignon (1999) suggest
most of the increase in school enrolment ob-
served in the 1990s is structural, rather than a
temporary response to weak labour market condi-
tions. Their results show also that a less generous
Unemployment Insurance system and higher
relative minimum wages have reduced structural
participation rates of both students and non-stu-
dents.9 Therefore, in line with recent empirical
evidence, the current analysis assumes half the
decline in youth participation rates reflects cycli-
cal factors, while the other half reflects structural
factors.
Prime-aged Adults
The participation rate of prime-aged men
(those aged 25-54) has declined in the 1990s, con-
tinuing the downward trend observed in the
1980s. The drop was more pronounced than in
the United States for men aged 25 -34, but similar
to that in the United States for those aged 35-54.
This suggests most of the fall in the participation
rate of prime-aged men was structural, although
some cyclical effects should have played a role for
those aged 25-34.
Looking ahead, there is a great deal of uncer-
tainty surrounding the evolution of the participa-
tion rate of these cohorts, since it is unclear if the
downward trend is completed. The current analy-
sis assumes the trend participation rate for those
aged 35-54 is near the actual participation rate
level and will remain there until the end of the
projection period. In contrast, the trend participa-
tion rate for males aged 25-34 is about one per-
centage point higher than the actual rate, but
lower than the U.S. rate for the same age group.
The participation rate of prime-aged women
(25-54) stopped rising at the end of the 1980s and
the outlook for their participation is uncertain. On
the one hand, their participation has shown little,
if any, sensitivity to the business cycle. On the
other, participation rates for prime-aged women
in the United States have recently started to rise
again. However, this is in the context of a tight la-
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fare generosity, and from lower participation rates
than in Canada for women aged 25-44. Our work-
ing assumptions for prime-aged women is for a
gradual increase of trend participation rates to 80
per cent over the projection period.10 Compared
with actual participation levels, this represents a
modest increase for women aged 25-45 but a sig-
nificant increase for those aged 45-54 (7.6 per-
centage points). The latter would represent a “co-
hort effect” as younger generations of women
with demonstrated strong attachment to the la-
bour market replace older generations who never
had such a strong attachment.
Older People
As for prime-aged adults, the recent evolution
of participation rates for older people (55 and
over) are different for men and women. The par-
ticipation rate of older men has declined in the
1990s, continuing the downward trend observed
in the two previous decades. The fall in participa-
tion rates of older males is, indeed, part of a long-
standing trend that began in the 1950s. In con-
trast, in the past two decades, participation rates
of older women have increased for those aged 55-
64, while they have declined slightly for those
aged 65 and over.
The introduction of public pension plans in the
mid-1960s and the increased share of the popula-
tion covered by private pension plans have with-
out a doubt played a key role in reducing the la-
bour market participation of older men. The
increased presence of pension plans may also
have played some role in keeping the participa-
tion rates of women over age 65 from rising de-
spite the long-standing increase in the participa-
tion of women aged 25-65. Moreover, as shown by
Italiano (1996), defined-benefit private and pub-
lic pension plans are structured to make early re-
tirement attractive by providing some net wealth
gains for those who retire before age 65. In all like-
lihood, this trend toward early retirement has
been compounded in the 1990s by more early re-
tirement packages, especially in the public sector,
and difficult economic conditions.
There is also a considerable difference between
Canadian and U.S. participation rates for older
people. The rates for older cohorts, both males
and females, are much higher in the United States
than in Canada. The difference is particularly
striking for men and women aged 65-69 and for
women aged 55-64 where the difference peaks at
13 percentage points. One notable exception is
the participation rate for men aged 55-64 that has
only recently started to fall below that of their U.S.
counterparts. Between the mid-1970s and the end
of the 1980s, Canadian rates were above U.S.
rates. 
The higher participation of older people in the
United States seems to be explained by differ-
ences in the social safety net and educational at-
tainment. First, as noted by Haritos (1998), it may
be traceable to the less pervasive social safety net
in the United States. For example, the lack of uni-
versal heath care coverage in the United States
and its high cost may force older people to work
longer.11 While Americans are eligible for Medi-
care at age 65, it is less comprehensive than Cana-
dian medical insurance, covering less than 50 per
cent of medical expenditures. Gruber and Madi-
ran (1995) concluded that introducing universal
health-insurance coverage in the United States
could lead to a large increase in the early retire-
ment rate.
Second, older Canadians tend to be less edu-
cated than their U.S. counterparts. A higher pro-











Canada 6.0 35.7 39.8 18.5
U.S. 4.6 41.2 27.5 26.8
Older 55+ cohort
Canada 32.0 36.5 23.1 8.5
U.S. 15.8 49.4 18.3 16.5
Table 4 Participation rate of Canadians aged 55 and









13.0 23.4 31.8 44.2 24.2
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pleted university or have high school education,
whereas in Canada there is a higher proportion of
people with an elementary or incomplete post-
secondary education (Table 3). Since participa-
tion rates are positively related to education (Ta-
ble 4), the fact older people are less educated in
Canada than in the United States may account for
some of the participation gap between the two
countries.
To assess the impact of education on the par-
ticipation rate differential between older Canadi-
ans and Americans, we have calculated a partici-
pation rate series combining the educational
attainment distribution of older Americans and
the education-specific participation rates of Cana-
dians aged 55 and over. The resulting series is
plotted with actual participation rates of older Ca-
nadians and Americans in Chart A18. Although
the education-adjusted Canadian participation
rate still lies below the U.S. participation rate in
recent years, it is equal or above the U.S. rate for
1976-87, suggesting educational attainment is an
important source of the difference.
One would expect a narrowing of the participa-
tion rate gap between older Canadians and
Americans as younger and more educated Cana-
dians age. As shown in Table 3, prime-aged Cana-
dians are almost as educated as their U.S. coun-
terparts. The proportion of those aged 25-54 with
only elementary education is similar in both
countries, while a lower proportion with a univer-
sity degree in Canada than in the United States is
partly offset by a higher proportion of Canadians
with some post-secondary education. In the
longer term, education prospects may even be
better. The proportion of young Canadians at-
tending school has increased from 45.4 per cent in
1984 to 60 per cent in 1996, while in the United
States the enrolment rate increased from 43.1 per
cent to 53.6 per cent.12 Moreover, the fact younger
generations are more educated than previous gen-
erations suggests the narrowing of the older co-
hort’s participation gap between Canadians and
Americans may be accompanied by an increase in
participation rates of older people in both coun-
tries.
The fact Canada is gradually becoming a more
educated society suggests very long-term pros-
pects for participation rates of older cohorts are
brighter than one would conclude by looking only
at recent trends. However, we are reluctant to ap-
ply this “optimism” to our participation rate pro-
jection for many reasons. First, although the
higher educational attainment of Canadians aged
25-54 may affect positively the participation of
older cohorts in coming decades, higher school
enrolment rates among youths will not affect the
participation rates of the cohort aged 55 and over
for three to four decades. Second, the trend to-
ward higher educational attainment has been go-
ing on for some time in Canada. The level of edu-
cational attainment of older Canadians, and
indeed for all Canadians, has been increasing for
several decades, while their participation rates
have been trending down. As noted above, other
factors have played an important role in that de-
cline — private and public pensions, social safety
net, and higher net wealth — and it is not clear the
effects of these factors have come to an end.
This is why we have not assumed any major
increases in the trend participation rates of older
people over the projection period in the baseline
projection. A noticeable exception is the partici-
pation rate of women aged 55-64, which is as-
sumed to continue its upward trend as younger
women with higher lifetime participation rates
enter that cohort. The trend participation rates of
other older cohorts are assumed to remain
roughly at their actual levels. To assess the impact
of this hypothesis on our results, an alternative
scenario, in which the participation rates of older
Canadians — apart from women aged 55-64 — in-
crease gradually to close all their actual gaps with
comparable U.S. rates by 2040 is also provided
(see Charts A11 to A16 for the profile of these al-
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Chart 1 Aggregate participation rates
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Participation Rate
The total-economy trend participation rate cal-
culated from the individual participation rates
and source population data is plotted in Chart 1.
In 1997, the estimated series suggests a trend par-
ticipation rate of 66.2 per cent, 1.4 percentage
points higher than the observed participation rate
of 64.8 per cent.13 This suggests that about half
the decline in the aggregate participation rate
since the last recession is structural while the
other half is cyclical. Our current estimate of the
structural level of the participation rate is higher
than the estimate of MacGregor and Mang (1996)
and Fortin and Fortin (1999), similar to the esti-
mate suggested by the aggregate equation of
Fortin and Fortin (1997), and lower than that of
Rubin and Lester (1997).14
More important, looking ahead, the trend par-
ticipation rate will continue to fall gradually as a
result of downward pressures from demographic
changes. By 2015, it is estimated it will be at about
63 per cent, down more than three percentage
points from the current trend level, and a rate
similar to that observed in the late 1970s. The
participation rate stabilizes only by the late 2030s
at about 58 per cent, down more than eight per-
centage points from the current trend level, and a
rate similar to that experienced in the early 1970s
but also in the 1920s and 1930s.
An alternative scenario, in which the participa-
tion rates of older Canadians — apart from
women aged 55-64 — increase gradually to close
all their actual gaps with comparable U.S. rates by
2040 is also presented in Chart 1. Assuming older
Canadians will increase their participation in the
labour market in the coming decades reduces
somewhat the extent of the fall in the aggregate
participation rate but does not change the overall
conclusion of the analysis. By 2040, the participa-
tion rate in the alternative scenario is 60 per cent,
compared with 58 per cent in the base case sce-
nario.
U.S. Experience
In contrast to the Canadian economy, the
United States experienced a slight increase in its
aggregate participation rate in the 1990s, from
66.5 per cent in 1990 to 67.1 per cent in 1997. This
suggests that, in contrast to Canada, the United
States  has not experienced any decline in its trend
participation rate. Applying the same methodol-
ogy used for Canadian data to that of the United
States suggests the divergence in the two coun-
tries’ structural participation rates reflects, in
large part, divergence in their recent demographic
evolutions.
A comparison of the demographic composition
effect in Canada and the United States between
1960 and 2010 is presented in Table 5. In Canada,
the demographic composition effect tended to
subtract from the aggregate participation rate
since the 1950s and will continue to do so in com-
ing years. However, the magnitude of the demo-
graphic composition effect differs in the two
countries, depending on the period considered. In
the 1950s and 1960s changes in the age composi-
tion of the population were exerting more down-
ward pressures on the aggregate participation rate
in the United States than in Canada. However,
since the 1970s, demographics have exerted more
drag on the participation rate in Canada than in
the United States. Indeed, in the 1980s, changes in
the age composition of the population added 0.7
percentage points to the U.S. rate, while they re-
moved 0.3 percentage points from the Canadian
equivalent.
Table 5 Average annual demographic composition effect,
Canada and the United States, 1950-2010
(Percentage points)1









1 The demographic composition effect for the United States was calculated by
holding the participation rates for the 14 individual age-sex groups constant at
their 1989 values, and aggregating them using civilian population weights. For
each cohort, the civilian population was obtained as the ratio of the labour force
to the participation rate. Because of data availability, the two older cohorts—65
to 69 and 70 and over—were combined together, reducing the number of
cohorts to 14.
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fect continued to show up more strongly in Can-
ada than the United States, removing almost one
percentage point from the Canadian participation
rate between 1990 and 1997, compared with less
than 0.1 of a percentage point from the United
States. As in Canada, the composition of the U.S.
source population shifted from those aged under
34 to those aged 35 and over during the 1990s.
However, in contrast to Canada, this change in
age-sex composition of the source population ex-
erted almost no downward pressures on the ag-
gregate participation rate. This is because Canada
experienced a much larger increase in the propor-
tion of the source population aged 65 and over
than the United States in the 1990s. The propor-
tion of the source population in this age group in-
creased by 1.3 percentage points in Canada in
1989-96, but only by 0.2 of a percentage point in
the United States (Table A2).
The divergence in the timing of the demo-
graphic composition effect between the United
States and Canada reflects the fact the United
States became an older society faster than Can-
ada. In 1950-70 in the United States, the propor-
tion of the population aged 65 and over increased
from 10.8 per cent to 13.9 per cent, while Canada
saw an increase from 10.9 per cent to 11.4 per
cent. In the 1970s the share of older people in the
population began to increase more rapidly in Can-
ada, allowing an almost complete catch-up to the
U.S. level by the end of the 1990s. In 1970-97, the
proportion of the population aged 65 and over
rose from 11.4 per cent to 15.3 per cent in Canada,
while it increased only from 13.9 per cent to 15.8
per cent in the United States.
The United States became an older society
faster in part because the Canadian baby boom
started later, lasted longer and was more intense
than the U.S. baby boom (Foot, 1996). Immigra-
tion policy has also played a role in skewing the
age pyramid in favour of youth in Canada, relative
to the United States. In Canada, a point system is
used to evaluate the applications of immigrants.
This is designed to favour the applications of
highly skilled and highly educated immigrants,
but it also places a premium on youth (points are
deducted for applicants over age 35). In contrast,
in the United States, family reunification is the
main objective of immigration policy. Immigra-
tion of immediate family members, such as par-
ents, is not subject to any numerical restrictions.
Immigrants entering the country under this provi-
sion account for a significant share of total immigra-
tion in the United States and the average age of im-
migrants is higher than in Canada (Borjas, 1993).
Looking ahead, the demographic composition
effect will also intensify in the United States but
will remain less of a drag on the aggregate partici-
pation rate than in Canada. This reflects the fact
Canada is expected to become an older society
than the United States, with its share of those aged
65 and over increasing to 16.7 per cent by 2010,
compared with 16.1 per cent in the United States
Conclusion
Clearly, the respective roles of cyclical and
structural factors underlying the evolution of par-
ticipation rates is the subject of considerable un-
certainty, but we hope we have highlighted the is-
sue by using a simple population accounting
framework. We have focused on demographic
changes that are the most certain component of
any participation rate projection. In that respect,
the conventional wisdom is that the ageing of the
population will start to dampen the aggregate par-
ticipation rate only around 2010 when the leading
edge of the baby boom generation will start to re-
tire. In contrast, our results indicate the retirement
of baby boomers will not start but rather intensify
a downward trend in aggregate participation re-
lated to longer life expectancy.
As a result, our calculations suggest the struc-
tural participation rate has been trending down
since 1989 and will continue to do so in coming
decades. Although our estimated rate depends on
the assumptions underlying individual trend par-
ticipation rates and the population projection, the
overall downward profile obtained in this paper is
robust with respect to any set of plausible as-
sumptions.
The fact Canadians are less likely to participate
in the labour market with the passage of time has
direct implications for the design of current and
future policies. This is because most feasible poli-
cies, such as those related to education, social
programs and pension systems, will affect labour
force participation only with long lags. Consider-
ing pension systems for example, it is probably
not just a question of reducing economic incen-
tives to early retirement but also moving toward a
more flexible labour market in which gradual re-
tirement is possible rather than “forcing” workers
  50  Canadian Business Economics   Summer 1999 into the choice of working full time or not working
at all. Additional economic research should be de-
voted to understanding the determinants of la-
bour market participation of various demo-
graphic groups and particularly older people aged
55 and over, who will account for 40 per cent of
the population in 30 years.
Bob Dugan is a senior economist at 
WEFA Inc. (bob.dugan@wefa.com).
Benoît Robidoux is Acting Senior Chief,
Economic Forecasting in the Economic
Analysis and Forecasting Division at Finance
Canada (robidoux.benoit@fin. gc.ca).
Notes
* The views expressed within this paper are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the Depart-
ment of Finance.
1. The medium growth population projection, which
covers 1993-2041, encompasses the following as-
sumptions.  First, the fertility rate remains constant at
1.7 children per woman over the entire forecast hori-
zon. Second, life expectancy at birth increases from
74.6 years and 80.9 years in 1991 to 78.5 years and 84
years in 2016 for males and females, respectively. After
2016, life expectancy is assumed to remain constant
at their 2016 levels. Third, the annual number of im-
migrants remains constant at its 1993 level of 250,000
over the entire projection period.
2. The results obtained by Fortin and Fortin (1999),
which decompose the the source population in only
six cohorts, show the estimated demographic effect
associated to changes in the composition of the source
population is very sensitive to the aggregation level
used in the analysis.
3. Econometric studies and U.S. data are only used to
benchmark individual trend participation rates after
1990.  Between 1976 and 1989,  the trend participa-
tion rates are obtained from an HP filter.
4. In these studies, the participation rate is regressed on
both structural and cyclical variables. The estimated
relationship is then used to purge cyclical effects from
the actual participation rate and obtain an estimation
of the structural or trend participation rate. One nota-
ble exception is Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) which
perform a cohort analysis. 
5. In calculating the demographic composition effect for
1921-2040 different population weights were used in
different sub-periods because of data availability.
First, for 1921-75, population data from CANSIM were
used.  Second, for 1976-97 labour force source popu-
lation data from the Labour Force Survey were used.
Because population data were used to calculate the
composition effect before 1976, the series calculated
between 1921 and 1975 was scaled by the ratio of the
demographic composition effect calculated with
population weights to the one calculated with source
population weights in 1976.  Finally, for the projec-
tion, source population for each age-sex cohort was
estimated by scaling each cohort’s population pro-
jected by Statistics Canada by its source population-to-
population ratio in 1997.
6. As noted in the previous section, this issue has been
analysed in only a few studies, however.
7. The empirical results obtained by Fortin and Fortin
(1999) suggest structural factors played a somewhat
larger role.
8. See Jennings (1997) for a descriptive analysis of this
issue.
9. The expected impact of higher relative minimum
wages on youth participation rates is uncertain since
it affects both the supply and demand of young work-
ers.
10. This assumption is consistent with the results pre-
sented in Beaudry and Lemieux (1999).
11. The same argument may apply to higher private edu-
cation costs in the United States than in Canada. 
12. For Canada the school enrolment rate is for those aged
15-24 and includes those attending school full-time as
well as part-time. For United States the school enrol-
ment rate is for those aged 16-24.  
13. In line with our estimated trend participation rate,
solid employment performance since mid-1998 has
triggered an increase in the actual participation rate,
which has reached 66.0 per cent in April 1999.
14. Rubin and Lester (1997) obtain this result by assuming
that the “structural” employment-to-population ratio
has not changed since 1989. It is interesting to note
that this implies a natural rate of unemployment of
about 5.5 per cent.
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Chart A5 Participation Rate, Males 25 to 34 Chart A6 Participation Rate, Females 25 to 34
Chart A7 Participation Rate, Males 35 to 44 Chart A8 Participation Rate, Females 35 to 44
Chart A9 Participation Rate, Males 45 to 54 Chart A10 Participation Rate, Females 45 to 54
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Fixed at 1989 Values
Chart A18 Participation Rate, 55 & Over,
Canada & United States Correcting
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Men 15-19 60.6 4.59 2.78 4.30 2.61 -0.29 -0.18 -0.18
Women 15-19 56.7 4.42 2.51 4.10 2.32 -0.32 -0.18 -0.36
Men 20-24 84.9 5.11 4.34 4.30 3.65 -0.80 -0.68 -1.04
Women 20-24 77.6 5.01 3.89 4.22 3.27 -0.80 -0.62 -1.66
Men 25-34 94.1 11.82 11.12 10.19 9.58 -1.63 -1.54 -3.19
Women 25-34 76.5 11.73 8.98 10.14 7.76 -1.59 -1.22 -4.41
Men 35-44 94.7 9.78 9.26 10.60 10.04 0.82 0.78 -3.63
Women 35-44 77.2 8.78 7.55 10.65 8.22  0.87 0.67 -2.96
Men 45-54 91.7 6.59 6.05 8.10 7.43 1.51 1.38 -1.57
Women 45-54 67.6 6.55 4.43 8.09 5.47 1.54 1.04 -0.53
Men 55-64 66.2 5.53 3.66 5.31 3.52 -0.22 -0.15 -0.68
Women 55-64 34.4 5.79 1.99 5.45 1.88 -0.34 -0.12 -0.80
Men 65-69 17.0 2.22 0.38 2.26 0.38 0.03 0.01 -0.79
Women 65-69 7.6 2.67 0.20 2.50 0.19 -0.17 -0.01 -0.80
Men 70+ 7.1 3.46 0.25 4.04 0.29 0.57 0.04 -0.76
Women70+ 2.2 4.94 0.11 5.76 0.13 0.82 0.02 -0.75
Total 67.48 100.00 67.48 100.00 66.73 0.00 -0.75 —














































Men 15-19 57.8 3.83 2.21 3.79 2.19 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
Women 15-19 54.0 3.80 2.05 3.66 1.97 -0.14 -0.08 -0.10
Men 20-24 85.2 4.69 4.00 4.29 3.66 -0.40 -0.34 -0.44
Women 20-24 72.4 4.98 3.61 4.39 3.18 -0.59 -0.43 -0.87
Men 25-34 94.5 11.31 10.68 9.86 9.31 -1.45 -1.37 -2.24
Women 25-34 73.5 11.68 8.58 10.21 7.50 -1.47 -1.08 -3.32
Men 35-44 94.5 9.43 8.92 10.58 10.00 1.14 1.08 -2.24
Women 35-44 76.0 9.87 7.50 10.90 8.28 1.03 0.78 -1.45
Men 45-54 91.1 6.43 5.86 7.81 7.12 1.38 1.26 -0.19
Women 45-54 70.5 6.85 4.82 8.22 5.80 1.38 0.97 0.78
Men 55-64 67.2 5.42 3.64 4.98 3.35 -0.43 -0.29 0.49
Women 55-64 45.1 6.07 2.74 5.48 2.47 -0.59 -0.27 0.22
Men 65+ 16.6 6.51 1.08 6.65 1.11 0.14 0.02 0.24
Women 65+ 8.3 9.14 0.76 9.18 0.77 0.04 0.00 0.25
Total 66.45 100.00 66.45 100.00 66.70 0.00 0.25 —
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